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The indigenization of crisis response strategies in the context of China
Yang Hu and Augustine Pang*
Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore
Crisis communication, which has been dominated by a practical perspective, has  
become a nexus where theory meets application. Despite mounting interest in theoret-
ical studies, crisis communication lacks cultural contextualization. Asian communica-
tion researchers have advocated for the need to indigenize communication, drawing 
relevance to cultural influences. In this study, the authors explored indigenous corporate 
crisis response strategies in the context of China through nine cases. Three Chinese 
indigenous strategies were identified through qualitative content analysis of corporate 
crisis responses. These strategies are “barnacle,” “third-party endorsement,” and “set-
ting up new topics.” The differences with Western frameworks were also discussed.
Keywords: indigenous approach; crisis response; China
Since the 1980s, Western public relations (PR) practitioners have examined crisis response 
strategies (CRSs) in the Western context (e.g. Benson, 1988; Snyder & Foster, 1983). The 
1982 case of Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol contamination is regarded as the gold standard 
in managing a product-tampering crisis (Brummer, 1999). Through analysis of such crisis 
case studies, Western scholars have identified a detailed set of CRSs (e.g. Benoit, 1995; 
Coombs, 1995; Hearit, 1994).
Over time, scholars from non-Western countries have adopted Western-based frame-
works to investigate crisis response in non-Western contexts. Two theories have been 
widely used (Avery, Lariscy, Kim, & Hocke, 2010): situational crisis communication 
theory (SCCT) (Coombs, 1995) and image repair theory (IRT) (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit 
& Pang, 2008). Image repair theory, for instance, has been described as a “dominant para-
digm for examining corporate communication in times of crises” (Dardis & Haigh, 2009, 
p. 10).
In contextualizing crisis studies, scholars have highlighted the significance of 
sociocultural factors in non-Western contexts. Previous studies have operationalized the 
“context” in a given country as the significant factor that can influence communication in 
the country (Low, Varughese, & Pang, 2011). It is critical for scholars and practitioners to 
study cultural elements and symbols before determining effective modes of communication. 
Being culturally competent to communicate effectively with culturally diverse publics has 
become more critical (Yeo & Pang, 2017). In the circuit of culture model posited by du 
Gay and colleagues, one would be better placed to understand corporate practice if one 
understood how social meanings are produced and reproduced (Gaither & Curtin, 2008). 
García (2011) noted that selection and effectiveness of the communication strategies vary 
greatly according to the cultural, political, and media variables of each country.
It is suggested that cultural dynamics and political and media systems all play a part 
in the selection of CRSs, as they are among the most important factors that should be 
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considered to explain the differences between societies with identical traditional cultures 
(Huang, 2010). For instance, although Taiwan and Mainland China share similar tradi-
tional cultures, their different political and media systems create different post-crisis social 
scenarios, which in turn influence their choice of crisis response strategies (Lyu, 2012). 
Veil and Yang (2012) also point out that much of the research on crisis communication take 
for granted that organizations operate in independent media environments. In China, some 
unique characteristics as far as managing crises are concerned include the importance of 
face as an important cultural factor (Ye & Pang, 2011). The authors posit that this follows 
the Chinese maxim, “The ugly things in our family should never go public.” The Chinese 
people would attempt to save face for their organizations whenever possible. “Losing face” 
would be tantamount to public humiliation. Thus, in a crisis, keeping dishonorable matters 
covered up is a common strategy used to “save face.” Ye and Pang (2011) further argued 
another cultural factor as high uncertainty avoidance. Chinese tend to “keep their mouths 
shut” since they believe that “Trouble is born out of the words you speak.” When difficult 
situations arise, Chinese organizations often decline to communicate or divert attention (Yu 
& Wen, 2003). Further, studies have examined cultural contexts that impact crisis response 
strategies. Yu and Wen (2003) adopted the culture-specific approach to examine CRSs in 
the context of Taiwan. Ye and Pang (2011) explored Sanlu’s crisis management as a mirror 
to understand the Chinese approach to crisis management.
However, an indigenous approach to examine corporate CRSs in the non-Western 
context is still a relatively nascent endeavor. Given the increasing incidents of crises 
making international headlines (Yu & Wen, 2003), it presents an intriguing opportunity 
to study China’s crisis management from an indigenous perspective (Fang, 2010). For 
this study, the authors examined CRSs employed in multiple crises by Chinese companies 
based on the typologies of CRSs derived from the IRT and SCCT, and examine which 
strategies were captured within these frameworks and which were not. As an exploratory 
study, it represents an emerging attempt to build on and extend crisis response typology 
by integrating the perspectives from non-Western countries for the construction of more 
inclusive theories.
This study responds to Huang’s (2012) call for greater understanding of Chinese 
culture and “relevant indigenous Chinese concepts” (p. 93). Similarly, Pratt (2012) argued 
for greater examination of cultural values and how crisis management is enacted within 
“organizational contexts” (p. 19). Motion, Haar, and Leitch (2012) argued for an indige-
nous framework based on cultural principles of how organizations operate and protocols 
(“the unwritten rules or guidelines that regulate conduct”) (p. 60) and how they affect 
organizational practice.
In conducting this study, the authors acknowledged that culture is not unidimensional 
and is full of complexity. We do not seek to simplify this. However, in the explication 
of Western culture, we draw on the wisdom of extant work and definitions. In terms of 
referencing Western research, most scholars unilaterally refer to them as Western-centric 
(Wang, 2011) or Euro-American (Huang, 2012). In calling for work on other cultures, 
scholars describe this as a “de-Westernization” process (Wang & Kuo, 2010, p.154) or 
“decentering away from Euro-American Theory” (p. 93). Thus far, the approaches taken 
to explore cultural issues in crisis response strategies have been used to apply cultural 
variables, such as Hofestede’s variables, before treating Western and non-Western cultures 
as unilateral. This is not to simplify cultures, but to explore cultural differences. Examples 
include highlighting cultural differences between the US and Japan (Haruta & Hallahan, 
2003) and Low et al.’s (2011) study on how culture influences image repair in Western and 
Asian governments.
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Overview of crisis response strategies
IRT (Benoit, 1995, 1997) offers five broad categories, with sub-categories, to repair organ-
izational image. These include denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of 
event, corrective action, and mortification. Coombs (1998) offered further explication of 
the relationships among crisis situations, crisis responses, and organization’s reputation 
using an accommodative–defensive continuum with seven responses along the continuum 
ranging from attacking the accuser to mortification (Figure 1).
In subsequent studies, Coombs (2007) further defined 10 primary and supplementary 
CRSs. The primary CRS postures consist of deny, diminish, and rebuild. The deny posture 
incudes attack the accuser, denial, and scapegoat. The diminish posture is made up of 
excuse and justification, and the rebuild posture consists of compensation and apology. 
Supplementary CRSs consist of ingratiation, reminder, and victimage.
Other frameworks developed in the West include Hearit’s (2006) apologiaand Sturges’ 
(1994) three categories of information content, amongst others.
Addressing the gap in non-Western CRSs, Huang, Lin, and Su (2005) conducted a 
survey of public relations practitioners from Taiwan’s top 500 companies. The new strat-
egy of diversion and a two-continuum matrix of defense–accommodation and specifi-
cation–ambiguity were proposed (Figure 2). Shi and Qian (2014) proposed the leading 
strategy, which means leading the development of crisis events toward an intended direc-
tion by seeking common values and interests of both senders and receivers.
Defense                                               Accommodation
Attack Denial Excuse Justification Ingratiation Corrective Mortification
accusers actions
Figure 1. Defense–accommodation continuum. (Coombs, 1998)
Specificity
Defense                                    Accommodation
Ambiguity 
Denial Concession
Diversion
Excuse
Justification
Figure 2. Five CRSs on the two-continuum matrix. (Huang et al., 2005)
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To capture the range of strategies posited, the authors have developed a comprehensive 
list of CRSs (see Table 1).
CRSs in the context of China
Corporate ownership and corporate crises
In this study, the authors further classified Chinese domestic companies into state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs). It is essential to distinguish 
Chinese companies because SOEs and POEs have different business orientations, organ-
izational structures, corporate cultures, and communication mechanisms that may lead to 
the employment of different CRSs in crises (Joseph, 2013).
SOEs refer to enterprises fully owned by the State through the State-owned Assets 
and Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council and of 
provincial, municipal, and county governments. As these industries hold monopoly over 
national resources, they often fail to check their behavior and ignore public feelings during 
a crisis (“SOEs must face,” 2011). POEs refer to economic units invested in or controlled 
by individuals, including limited liability corporations, shareholding corporations, part-
nership enterprises, and sole investment enterprises (Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2010). Some 
POEs’ emphasis on economic returns makes them to more likely sacrifice food safety and 
quality (Wang & Jin, 2007).
The indigenous approach to the CRSs
Indigenous research is defined as “providing unique and novel perspectives concerning 
a local phenomenon” (Li, Leung, Chen, & Luo, 2012, p. 9). Indigenous communication 
research and de-Westernization have long been debated among Asian scholars. Chung 
(2011), for instance, argued that the call for indigenization has been “plagued by an over-
simplified (linear) conception of context” (p. 94) as unidimensional, and researchers need 
to “go beyond the search for rules” (p.97) of social practice. Chen (2011) argued that indi-
genization was not to establish dichotomous patterns or either–or habits of categorizing 
thoughts.
Scholars have summarized the development of indigenous research into four stages 
(Morris, Leung, Ames, & Lickel, 1999). Stage 1, the most basic approach, involves local 
application of extant theory from the West as basic exploitation. Stage 2, a more advanced 
approach, involves cross-context comparative research to derive novel constructs or 
measures unique to a local phenomenon. Stage 3 involves the development of a novel 
context-specific theory to complement or supersede the extant theory from the West. 
Stage 4, the most advanced approach, involves integrating the above approaches toward a 
geocentric framework.
Most indigenous research about CRSs concerning China remains at Stage 1, with few 
theoretical contributions (Li et al., 2012). This study aims to move to Stage 2, to uncover 
CRSs across various crisis situations so that more meaningful constructs can develop 
(Diers & Tomaino, 2010).
Weaknesses of Western frameworks
While both IRT and SCCT are useful and practical frameworks for designing and assessing 
communication in times of crisis, both have been criticized for the lack of non-Western 
perspectives.
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For IRT typologies, there are opportunities for further explication through examination 
of more cases in different cultures or contexts (Harlow, Brantley, & Harlow, 2011). For the 
SCCT, its weaknesses are: first, the unidimensional nature of the theory (Fediuk, Pace, & 
Botero, 2010); second, IRT fails to capture other strategies that have been unearthed. For 
instance, the strategy of “stonewalling” has been found to be a tactic that connotes hiding 
from responsibility altogether (Smithson & Venette, 2013).
Given how Western crisis communication theories can be ethnocentric and their typol-
ogies not exhaustive, the authors have adopted an indigenous approach to examine: (1) 
CRSs used by Chinese corporations; and (2) indigenous CRSs not captured by the existing 
typologies. The research questions (RQs) are as follows:
RQ1: What CRSs did Chinese organizations use to manage crises based on the typology of 
crisis responses derived from IRT and SCCT?
RQ2: What indigenous CRSs are identified in the context of China?
Method
Case studies
In this study, the authors selected nine cases (see Table 2) involving five Chinese SOEs 
and four Chinese POEs. The cases were selected for the following reasons. First, the 
cases reflect crisis responses of corporations with different ownerships subjected to varied 
influences of politics, economics, culture, media, and other significant social contextual 
factors in China. Moreover, the SOEs and POEs, form the bedrock in the Chinese economy 
(Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2010). Second, the selected cases include environmental crises and 
food and drug safety crises, which are two of the greatest concerns of the Chinese publics 
in recent years (Mou, 2014). These cases represent the types of crises that have occurred in 
China in recent years, eight of which were listed in the top 10 brands crisis communication 
from 2010 to 2013 (Top ten crisis cases in China, 2010, 2011; Top ten crisis cases in 2012, 
2013).
Data collection
Data were collected from two Chinese online newspaper collections: www.nfmedia.com 
and www.people.com.cn, which published articles from major newspapers, Nanfang 
Daily and People’s Daily. Nanfang Daily is owned by media giant Nanfang Media Group. 
Nanfang Media Group has been acknowledged for publishing articles based on aggressive 
reporting and liberal politics, as well as higher-quality reporting and objectivity compared 
to State-run publications (Pan, 2008). People’s Daily is known as the official media of 
the Chinese government (“People’s Daily chief warns of ‘historic mistake’ if China loses 
grip on new media,” 2016). These two newspapers, with their different orientations, were 
chosen to reduce potential bias brought by a single newspaper or perspective.
Previous studies have found the use of media texts to understand how organizations 
communicate in crisis to be rigorous (Carey, 2003). These include Ho and Hallahan’s 
(2004) study on Taiwan’s post-earthquake crisis communication using advertising texts, 
and Meng’s (2010) study on the use of image repair strategies in China using news cover-
age. Benoit (2000) argued that news reports are a viable way of analyzing crises. Other 
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studies, such as Cai, Lee, and Pang (2009), Chua and Pang (2012), Drumheller and Benoit 
(2004), and Zhang and Benoit (2004), have used news reports in content analysis.
In addition, for some of the older cases, the authors searched the first 10 pages of 
google.com and baidu.com and verified the data by comparing them with the China 
National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database in China. The CNKI reports itself to 
be the most authoritative, comprehensive, and largest source of China-based information 
resources in the world (“What is CNKI?” 2014).
The data collected comprise news coverage, news releases from official websites, 
and statements posted on official corporate microblogs (Sina Weibo) within one month of 
each crisis. News coverage without direct quotations from companies’ spokespersons or 
top management was excluded. The final sample comprises 533 news articles, two news 
releases and 61 posts on Sina Weibo officially published by the companies.
Data analysis: qualitative content analysis
Qualitative content analysis allows for the interpretation of content using systematic clas-
sification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns (Schreier, 2012). The differ-
ence between quantitative and qualitative content analysis is that the former is a research 
technique used to examine manifest content of communication in terms of frequency 
counts (Berelson, 1952), while the latter goes beyond frequency counts. Besides analyzing 
manifest content, it dives deeper and seeks to understand latent meanings (Kracauer, 1952).
A common feature of qualitative content analysis is that it goes beyond merely consid-
ering the pattern and prevalence of usage of an individual word as the unit of analysis. It 
also considers the contents or statements at the level of a context, a structural process, or a 
social interaction (Oswick, 2012). For this study, it was employed to identify characteris-
tics of messages (Neuendorf, 2002) based on media texts.
For this study, predetermined categories were developed using definitions in IRT and 
SCCT as guiding frameworks. The main analytical categories are derived from integrating 
the categories of CRSs in SCCT and IRT.
The coding frame is at the heart of qualitative content analysis. The way in which data 
are analyzed is as follows: first, it requires researchers to “translate” all meanings that are 
of interest to the categories of a coding frame; second, the researchers then classify succes-
sive parts of the data according to these categories (Schreier, 2012).
In this study, the first author followed the coding frame and categorized the data accord-
ingly to capture the nuances of the concept (indigenous crisis response strategy) identified 
in the research questions. For instance, in the environment crises, all crisis responses from 
the companies involved, as well as the central government, were noted. It was found that 
the companies followed closely what the government did. Organizational leaders attended 
press conferences when government officials were present; organizational leaders were 
dismissed after the government announced the removal of certain government officials 
who were found culpable; organizational leaders made apologies after government offi-
cials apologized. This practice of following what the government did could not be clas-
sified into any existing category in the Western frameworks; thus, the authors coded it as 
“following central government closely,” which the authors termed barnacle strategy.
Measures were put in place to ensure that the coding process was rigorous. First, the first 
author hired two coders who are communication postgraduates with backgrounds in media 
studies. Both were from Mainland China and have been trained in qualitative content anal-
ysis with previous experience in crisis communication and image management. Second, 
two professors, who were not authors but with expertise in discourse analysis and crisis 
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communication, were engaged to instruct the coding procedures and provide advice when 
uncertainties and disputes emerged. For instance, in the Shuanghui pork scandal (case F), 
the CEO repeatedly emphasized that illegal feed additives were utilized in upstream hog 
farms. Both coders were unable to decide whether it belonged to “excuse,” “scapegoat,” or 
“differentiation.” To solve the dispute, the coders consulted with the professors, reviewed 
the definitions and connotations of each category, re-examined the circumstances under 
which the communication took place, and compared responses in similar crises in China. 
The understanding of the context, which is China in this study, helped the team decide that 
it was more appropriate to classify the response as the strategy of “scapegoat.”
Third, the authors also reviewed and discussed the key words of each category to 
identify what were not clearly classified and made systemic decisions on classification 
and categorization schemes. The agreement reached nearly 97% after pre-test and several 
rounds of discussions between the two coders and consultations with the professors from 
China. For qualitative content analysis, the consistency score between coders was found 
to be rigorous.
To answer RQ1, deductive thinking was adopted. Operational definitions of different 
CRSs were identified by referring to key characteristics of CRSs in IRT and SCCT. All 
responses were investigated by looking at latent contents and coded using the predeter-
mined categories. If multiple contents were identified, they were coded as different strate-
gies. Coders examined the data of each category to determine whether subcategories were 
needed. Data that could not be classified into any of the CRS categories were re-examined 
and given descriptions of their characteristics.
For RQ2, inductive analysis was adopted. Elo and Kyngas (2008) argued that inductive 
reasoning works better in creating coding categories of new knowledge. By reviewing data 
in the “others” category, coders tried to derive core meanings and summarize themes and 
patterns.
Results
RQ1 explored CRSs employed based on the SCCT and IRT frameworks. The CRSs found 
are explicated below.
CRSs used based on SCCT and IRT
Apology
“Apology” appeared in all nine cases and repeatedly in some cases. For instance, in case H, 
the first announcement from Jiugui Liquor on 21 November 2012 stated that it “sincerely 
apologized for the confusion and misunderstanding we have caused” (Jiugui Made an 
Apology, 2012). Two days later, in the second announcement, the company again apolo-
gized. The general manager of the company expressed “deep apology” on 26 November, 
which was the third apology from the company. Even in case D, an accidental crisis of the 
PX project, the mayor of Kunming, Yunnan Province bowed and apologized to the public.
Compensation
Compensation should follow the use of apology to demonstrate the company has accepted 
responsibility (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). However, in the cases examined, although 
apology was articulated, Chinese companies seldom talked about compensation. Only in 
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cases C and E did companies mention compensation. For instance, Sinopec said it would 
bear corresponding compensation liabilities according to the investigation results of the 
State Council, but did not specify the amount.
Corrective action
Another strategy all companies employed was corrective action. For instance, in case E, 
Sinopec marked 22 November as a day to strengthen awareness of production safety and 
continued to overhaul safety hazards in its network. In case D, when the public showed its 
displeasure towards the level of transparency in information disclosure and raised doubts 
about safety, the mayor stated that the PX project would not carry on as long as the public 
disagreed. In food and drug safety crises, the companies initiated recalls. For instance, 
Nongfu suspended producing water and removed its products from shelves in Beijing.
Denial
This is another favored strategy used by companies. It was often used when information 
is lacking. For instance, Sinopec denied its slow responses to the explosion blasts. CNPC 
denied the air was polluted. Jiugui denied the existence of plasticizer, and Nongfu denied 
its products were of poor quality.
Attack the accuser
Only Nongfu and Xiuzheng (cases G & I) used this strategy. Beijing Times was the first 
media to expose the poor water quality and criticize the poor standard of Nongfu Spring 
bottled water. Nongfu attacked and refuted Beijing Times several times. First, Nongfu 
said the reports were unsubstantiated. Second, it claimed that the intensity of the negative 
coverage was not acceptable. Third, Nongfu attacked Beijing Times by using terms like, 
“crossed the line” and “lost the awe of law.” In the Xiuzheng case, the vice president simi-
larly refuted CCTV’s reports.
Justification (minimization)
In both crisis types, justification was used to reduce the severity of the crisis. For instance, 
Zijin (case C) published a statement after the exposure and emphasized that the pollution 
was non-toxic. CNPC (Yunnan) (case D) also pointed out the PX project had little effect on 
human health. In the explosion case, CNPC (Jilin) (case A), the environment department 
deputy director said Benzene would not cause any side effects on humans after it was 
burned. Similarly, Jiugui (case H) stated that the amount of the plasticizer used was within 
limits and would not cause any danger to humans.
Scapegoat
Also known as victimage, this happens when guilt is heaped on another. Allport (1954) 
considered scapegoating to be an important aspect of prejudice. In the Chinese context, for 
instance, the underprivileged community of farmers (Qian, 2002) is always used as scape-
goats by companies (Barboza, 2008). This is often observed in food safety crises. Compa-
nies use this strategy to show their innocence. For instance, in case F, after apologizing to 
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the public, the chairman said the company was the scapegoat, and the problem was caused 
in another section of the industrial chain.
Bolstering
Bolstering was only used in case B. The management of CNPC (Liaoning) held a confer-
ence to award some employees for their “heroism” in the emergency rescue even before the 
cause of the accident was identified.
Transcendence
Only Zijin Mining (case C) used this strategy. It used it to defend the delay in reporting 
the pollution, claiming it was done out of the need to preserve social stability. In previ-
ous instances, the argument to maintain a harmonious society and to avoid public panic 
had been used to explain delays in notification of crises or as cover-ups, and this practice 
received criticisms from international circles (Chen, 2008).
Differentiation
Differentiation, a variation of denial or blame shifting, is identified as separation, or stating 
that the act was committed by a “bad apple” (Brinson & Benoit, 1999). The strategy places 
emphasis on redefining the facts of a case. It is used to distinguish the act in question from 
other similar actions by making it seem less offensive than comparable acts. The basic 
premise of a differentiation response is that the audience may have misunderstood the 
company’s behavior as deplorable. The company then tries to make a case that the act in 
question is acceptable (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). Only Shuanghui (case F) used this tactic 
by differentiating itself from Sanlu’s melamine crisis, which occurred in 2008. The Sanlu 
case, which resulted in thousands of sick babies and four deaths, was widely considered 
a malicious act to gain greater profit (Lim, 2013). During Shuanghui’s crisis (case F), the 
chairman told the media that the company would not become the next Sanlu and further 
explained the essential differences between Sanlu and Shuanghui.
Defeasibility
In cases F and H, this was used, given the lack of national standards for the measurement 
of plasticizer levels. For instance, the deputy manager of Jiugui (case H) said the company 
did not have any method to detect the existence of plasticizer since the government did not 
ask for such reporting.
RQ2 examined strategies employed that are not captured by SCCT and IRT.
CRSs not based on SCCT and IRT
These were classified into three themes:
(1)  Following central government closely;
(2)  Gaining the third-party endorsement; and
(3)  Setting up new topics.
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Barnacle
The authors named the tactic of “following central government closely” the barnacle 
strategy. A barnacle is a crustacean arthropod distantly related to crustaceans such as crabs, 
lobsters, and shrimp (Lohse & Raimondi, 2007). The term of barnacle is used in different 
fields to describe the phenomenon of one attaching itself to another larger object to obtain 
potential benefits. For example, in business and marketing, barnacle customers refer to 
those who are loyal to the brand (Reinartz & Kumar, 2002). The “barnacle effect” takes 
place when one relies on a higher authority to help it smooth matters over.
The authors found when some SOEs were embroiled in environment crises, more often 
than not, the central government would take over the management of the crisis, to include 
releasing information, holding press conferences, overseeing rescue work, and sometimes 
even apologizing to the public. The companies usually kept silent or maintained a low 
profile. In recent years, the public has increasingly criticized such practices. Some improve-
ments have been observed. Some companies behave less passively by accepting interviews 
with the media and releasing information through their official platforms. Nevertheless, 
in most cases, the strategy SOEs use is to follow the central government’s position. For 
instance, when the central government announced the removal of culpable government 
officials, companies would similarly dismiss relevant leaders (case E, Sinopec Group oil 
pipeline explosion in East China); other times central government officials would make an 
apology to the public, and the companies would follow suit (case D, the PX project held up 
by Chinese protesters in Kunming, Yunnan Province).
Third-party endorsement
This strategy refers to organizations taking the initiative to seek help and support from 
outside experts or refer to reports from such experts. Western companies tend to reinforce 
and reiterate their good deeds (Coombs, 2004), thereby enhancing the effects of other strat-
egies. In China, because humility is respected as a value, bolstering is regarded as a risky 
strategy especially when one had committed wrong.
In China, companies use the third-party endorsement strategy when they deny the accu-
sation, minimize the severity of crisis, or make a public apology. It serves as a supple-
mentary strategy that can be employed with other strategies to reinforce or demonstrate 
collective power. For instance, in case H, experts from an alcohol association became 
third-party endorsers and claimed that plasticizer was not a food additive. In case G, an 
expert from the Ministry of Health granted third-party endorsement and claimed that the 
medicines taken would not have too much chrome if six capsules were taken each day. In 
case D, CNPC (Yunnan) publicized an announcement about its project by referring to the 
national environmental protection agency.
Setting up new topics
This strategy involves companies raising different topics that immediately attract and redi-
rect the media’s and public’s attention from the crisis itself. This strategy is inspired by 
the concept of strategic ambiguity (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). Instead of keeping silent 
or covering up the crisis, these Chinese companies dramatized the incident or created a 
publicity stunt to divert people’s attention.
The most obvious example is in case I, when the company started a public debate 
about “consensus violence” and indignantly stated that the sudden halt of production in 
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Beijing was “out of dignity,” which prompted public speculation. In case F, the company 
held a grand public apology meeting in a stadium; the meeting drew tens of thousands of 
people and succeeded in directing people’s attention away from the pork scandal (Zhao, 
2011).
Discussion
Inconsistencies with Western frameworks
Through qualitative content analysis of the nine crisis cases, new CRSs were discovered. 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that some inconsistencies with the SCCT were also found. 
First, according to Coombs (2004), level of responsibility is a primary indicator of how 
much threat the crisis is to the organization’s reputation and which CRSs are necessary to 
address the threat. The three threat intensifiers include crisis history, relationship history, 
and severity.
All five environmental crises, except case D (low severity, low attribution of responsi-
bility), can be classified into the victim or accidental type. Based on SCCT, deny or dimin-
ish strategies should be used. What was inconsistent with SCCT was that the government 
took over crisis management, held press conferences, released relevant information, and 
comforted the public. The mayor of Kunming City even bowed and apologized to the 
public who demonstrated on the street.
Secondly, in SCCT, the CRSs used should match the circumstances. For instance, if 
an organization is not guilty, the denial strategy should be used, and it is neither neces-
sary nor appropriate to take corrective actions (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997). However, in 
China, denial and corrective action were used together. For instance, Jiugui (case H) made 
apologies several times but denied wrongdoing. In addition, it is suggested that when the 
company is at fault, ingratiation techniques should be subtle, and third-party endorsement 
is not recommended (MacLiam & Barker, 2009). However, in all four cases of food and 
drug safety crisis, third-party endorsement was used intensively to reinforce various strat-
egies.
Thirdly, SCCT assumed that attributions of responsibility and crisis response were 
unidimensional. However, it is found that the strategy of setting new topics could alter 
stakeholders’ perceptions of responsibility. For example, in both G and H, companies tried 
to use new topics to persuade or convince the public that they were victims.
Crisis response strategies: Western vs Chinese indigenous
Barnacle vs shifting the blame
Barnacle strategy is different from IRT (Benoit, 1995) and SCCT (Coombs, 2004), as 
this strategy is more behavior-oriented rather than rhetoric-focused. In previous stud-
ies, research about CRSs mostly adopted a rhetoric approach with the focus on actual 
content of crisis communication or what an organization said (Heath, 2009). The barnacle 
distinguishes from “shifting the blame” in that the latter implies redirecting accusation to 
another, in this case, the government, while the former connotes reliance on another, in this 
case, the government. It also means organizations take directions from the government. 
SOEs, for instance, regard the government as a shelter to seek solace in. In a crisis, SOEs 
would immediately approach the government to manage the media by downplaying or 
covering up the incident. This is also evident in instances when the central government 
announced the removal of culpable government officials; organizations would similarly 
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dismiss respective corporate leaders (Yao, 2014). Likewise, when the central government 
apologized to the public, the companies would follow suit (Ming, 2013).
Third-party endorsement vs bolstering
Third-party endorsement and bolstering both serve as supplementary strategies to be 
employed with other main CRSs for strengthening effects. When a crisis occurs, organiza-
tions in China often resort to third parties, especially those with higher social status such as 
public intellectuals, celebrities, and experts, for their support, compared to many Western 
organizations which tend to resolve the crisis on their own. The oft-cited Johnson & John-
son management of the Tylenol crisis in 1982 by immediately instituting product recall is a 
classic example (Rehak, 2002). This distinction could be explained by the difference of the 
status of third parties in Chinese and Western contexts. In China, the third party often acts 
as an authority figure who projects a “know-it-best” image in the eyes of Chinese public 
(Yu & Wen, 2003). In the West, the third party can be defined as persons or groups who 
get involved in a conflict between two parties with the intention of helping with its reso-
lution (Kozan & Ergin, 1998). Millner, Veil, and Sellnow (2011) argued that an inherent 
challenge in the third party is the lack of immediate access to primary information about 
the crisis. Scholars have focused on the public’s influence in granting legitimacy to those 
accused of wrongdoing instead of the third party (Griffin, 2008). This study demonstrates 
how third-party endorsements are leveraged to help the organization.
Setting up new topics vs transcendence
The strategy of setting up new topics shares some similarities with the strategy of transcend-
ence that is used in I. For example, both aim to redirect the public’s attention. However, 
instead of reacting to accusations by diverting attention or putting the matter “to rest” 
(Huang et al., 2005, p. 235), setting up new topics is more proactive in that organizations 
raise irrelevant topics, dramatize, or create a publicity stunt to shift attention from the real 
issue at hand. This strategy found veracity and traction among practitioners interviewed 
(Hu & Pang, 2016). While transcendence is a form of symbolic action wherein compa-
nies redefine their acts by emphasizing more important considerations in the larger ethical 
context (Hearit, 1997), it is different from “setting up new topics” in that it does not just 
redirect an issue to general or abstract ideas, but seeks to have actions viewed in an entirely 
different light in terms of elevated ideals.
Organizational level: SOEs vs POEs
Based on the findings, SOEs usually seek direct help from the government, while POEs do 
not have such backing. The SOEs’ status also means they have no choice but to rely on the 
government. What the authors have observed is that evidence shows that the barnacle is 
mainly employed by SOEs. SOEs’ dependence on the government is regarded as a habitual 
behavior. For instance, SOEs tend to seek government’s help to manage negative news (Hu 
& Pang, 2016). On the contrary, POEs seek government-linked entities as third parties for 
support. Besides, POEs were more likely to set up new topics by raising irrelevant topics 
and sometimes dramatizing the incident or creating a publicity stunt to divert people’s 
attention, while SOEs would usually keep silent or slip into obscurity by being absent from 
the press conference, refusing interviews, or not publicizing information about the crisis on 
their official websites (Hu & Pang, 2016).
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Crisis type, attribution of responsibility, and crisis response strategies
Preventable crises connote strong crisis responsibility and threaten an organization’s 
reputation gravely . Organizations would be accused of willfully allowing the crisis to 
erupt, resulting in injuries, death, product recalls, and industrial accidents (Coombs, 2007). 
Conversely, accidental crises, like claims of the organization behaving undesirably, cause 
minimal blame and reputational damage to organizations (Coombs, 2007).
Based on the cases examined, it is difficult to draw connections among the types of 
strategies used, given the attribution of responsibility and crisis type, given our meth-
odological limitations. However, what was found was that among all the five cases of 
environmental crises discussed, four were oil spill- or waste leak-related crises that 
resulted in severe injuries and deaths. There were strong attributions of responsibility 
to the SOEs involved, as these were seen as preventable organizational misdeeds arising 
from management misconduct. Among the five cases, the consistent strategies used were 
barnacle and apology, even for the case where the attribution of responsibility was weak 
(case D).
In the six out of nine cases examined where there were strong attributions of respon-
sibility, the consistent strategies used were also barnacle and apology, followed by some 
variations of corrective action and third-party endorsements. In the other three cases where 
there were minimal attributions of responsibility, third-party endorsement was consistently 
used (see Table 3).
There is, therefore, strong merit in suggesting that regardless of the crisis type, in 
instances where the attributions of responsibility were strong, barnacle, apology, some 
form of corrective action/compensation, and third-party endorsement were the strategies 
used. Thus, in addition to applying corrective action/compensation and offering apology, 
Table 3. Crisis type, attribution of responsibility and main CRSs employed.
Case Crisis type Attribution of responsibility Main CRSs employed
A Environmental crisis Strong Barnacle, apology, corrective 
actions
B Environmental crisis Strong Barnacle, apology, corrective 
actions
C Environmental crisis Strong Barnacle, apology, compensa-
tion, transcendence
D Environmental crisis Minimal Barnacle, justification, apology, 
third-party endorsement
E Environmental crisis Strong Barnacle, apology, compensa-
tion, corrective actions
F Food crisis Strong Setting up new topics, scape-
goat, differentiation third-party 
endorsement
G Drug crisis Strong Setting up new topics, attack the 
accuser, third-party endorsement
H Food crisis Minimal Setting up new topics, denial, 
justification, third-party endorse-
ment
I Food crisis Minimal Setting up new topics, attack the 
accuser, third-party endorsement
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which are strategies found to be effective where attributions of responsibility are high in 
Western frameworks (Blaney, Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002), Chinese organizations apply addi-
tional strategies of barnacle and third-party endorsement to the repertoire.
Contextual factors: political, societal, and cultural contexts of mainland China
This study on organizational CRSs focuses on implicit routine strategic behaviors beyond 
obvious situational discursive tactics. China’s culture revolves around group relationships, 
strict power structures, and risk aversion. Although China has spent the last two decades 
striving to achieve a more globalized outlook, its historic, national, and business cultures 
are still evident in today’s organizational management (Handy, 2003). Social stability has 
always been considered the top priority for the government in crisis communication, espe-
cially when SOEs are involved. When crises become public, they cause social disorder 
and damage the government’s reputation. The strategies used thus reflect such contextual 
realities.
Use of “barnacle”
The barnacle strategy is mainly used by SOEs. Their organizational structure and culture 
are closely related to the Chinese traditional perspective of cherishing unity and pursu-
ing stability (Cai, 2012). In addition, there is a sense of duty and loyalty towards one’s 
superior, not the people below, nor his constituents. Many Chinese must adulate their 
superiors in order to ensure continued employment in governmental positions (Ding & 
Xu, 2015). In ancient China, “the purpose of rites was to maintain a hierarchical order in 
the society and families, such as the relations between the close and the distant, the noble 
and the humble, as well as the superior and the inferior” (Shen, 2010, p.134). According 
to Shen (2010), rites had become the general principle in social relations. Besides, relying 
on the government is beneficial for SOEs because their stakeholders generally trust the 
government (Public Trust in Government, 2014). The media also play a significant role 
in the employment of the “barnacle” strategy. The central government owns and controls 
important Party media like the People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency (Chen, 2008). 
Both central and provincial governments can manipulate the information flow on online 
and traditional media.
Use of third-party endorsement
Such use can be attributed to the Chinese public’s characteristics and cultural features of 
collectivism. The public’s obedience to authority reflects the old patriarchal system and 
autocratic monarchy in ancient China (LeVine, 2010). The public usually trusts third-par-
ties such as the experts, independent institutions, and regulators. In addition, the invitation 
of the third-party reflects the “collectivism” in traditional Chinese cultures also reflected in 
organizational cultures (Wong, 2001).
Use of “setting up new topics”
Chinese indirect communicative styles, the audience’s shrinking attention span, and 
profit-oriented media are argued to contribute to the application of “setting up new 
topics” (Hu & Pang, 2016). First, the Chinese thrive on indirect communication and 
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speak in an implicit way. This is to prevent dirty linen from being washed in public. 
Yu and Gu (1990) stated that implicit communication is considered a social rule in 
Chinese culture, and setting up new topics help organizations preserve face, a way out 
of the situation in which one is caught. Second, audiences seem to have short attention 
spans. They are generally more interested in entertainment news, and their attention on 
a certain issue does not last long. Setting up new topics would present fodder for new 
discussion at the various grassroots levels. The public’s attention turns to the new and 
more-often-sensational news reported in the media, so much so that the original crisis 
fades into oblivion. Unethical media have been accused of publicizing such sensational 
news for profit-making, which is also connected to the implementation of the strategy 
(Hu & Pang, 2016).
Conclusion
The main objective of this study is to explore the indigenous CRSs employed by Chinese 
corporations by examining crisis cases. Three CRSs, which were not captured in the domi-
nant crisis response, were unearthed. For an exploratory study, it has set the first imprints 
for other studies to build on.
A few observations are in order. Firstly, the factor of crisis responsibility attribution 
is not always the key indicator for the CRSs employed by organizations in China. For 
instance, the government plays a significant role in corporate decisions, especially in 
the SOEs’ strategic directions. This further explains why it is essential to consider the 
Chinese social contexts before applying any Western theoretical framework. Secondly, 
in China, the crisis severity perceived by the public is not always based on the fact, 
especially when the crisis happened to SOEs. The severity of the crisis in the SOEs is 
largely influenced by government decisions. Chen (2008) asserted that “new news, old 
news, and no news” was a political communication strategy in the olden times in China. 
In other words, to report or not is a political statement. Today, crisis severity could be 
determined by the media report frequency, the subject, or the tone, which is still under 
the regulation and instruction of the government. Thirdly, Chinese indigenous CRSs are 
more like institutionalized strategies instead of situational ones. What is observed is that 
SOEs, by virtue of their ownership and structure, often adopt strategies like barnacle 
because they rely and run to the government for shelter to ride out the crisis. Studies of 
organizational CRSs thus need to focus on implicit routine strategic behaviors beyond 
obvious situational discursive tactics.
This study has a few limitations. First, it lacks the audience perspective, which increas-
ingly attracts attention in crisis communication (Coombs, 2010). Second, the study does 
not provide a longitudinal examination of corporate CRSs, such as how Chinese compa-
nies have changed since the late 1970s when the reform began. Third, as data of corporate 
CRSs collected from social media were limited, it may fail to capture some other cultural 
nuances. Despite the limitations, this does not invalidate the findings.
This article extends the typologies of CRSs mainly developed by Western scholars with 
the emphasis on not only the rhetorical but also behavioral aspects. Rather than completely 
dismantling the field, the authors explored the universality of concepts before adopting a 
culture-specific approach aimed at exploring particularities that are context-specific. Wang 
and Kuo (2010) recommended this approach for studies on indigenization. Huang et al. 
(2005) used the same approach.
Future studies can explore the distinct relationships between corporate ownership 
and the CRSs used. Another area to examine is audience perspectives and reactions to 
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CRS strategies of Chinese organizations. Coombs (2010) alluded to the criticality of the 
audience or stakeholder who is most affected by the impasse. An “audience orientation” 
(p. 721) involves understanding how people perceive the situation, react to the strategies 
implemented, perceive the organization, and intend to behave toward the organization. 
Additionally, current research did not devote much attention to the issue of differenti-
ated stakeholders, but treated stakeholders as though they were one homogeneous group 
(Frandsen & Johansen, 2010). Another area of research could be to understand the effects 
of these strategies on marginalized publics and their advocates, as Waymer and Heath 
(2007) have done, primary stakeholders who are affected by the crisis. Future studies can 
examine the dynamic community which reflects diverse cultures.
Practically, practitioners, particularly those who want to practice in China, would be 
better placed if they understood the Chinese contexts to determine which are the most 
appropriate CRSs instead of applying Western CRSs indiscriminately. It is also important 
for them to understand contextual factors, such as the role of government, and societal 
factors, such as the need to preserve social harmony.
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Appendix 1
Table A1. Categories of the CRSs.
Case Strategy Categories Subcategories Sources
A CNPC (JL) 1 Deny 1 Attack the 
 accuser
1 Spokesperson
B CNPC 
(LN)
2 Diminish 2 Denial 2 CEO/chairman
C Zijin 
 Mining
3 Rebuild 3 Scapegoat 3 Other dominant 
 coalitions
D CNPC 
(YN)
4 Bolster 4 Excuse 4 Official website
E Sinopec 
(SD)
5 Others 5 Justification 5 Official weibo
F Shuanghui 6 Provocation 6 Others
G Xiuzheng 7 Defeasibility
H Jiugui 8 Differentiation
I Nongfu 9 Transcendence
10 Corrective 
actions
11 Compensation
12 Apology
13 Ingratiation
14 Victimage
15 Others
